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Abstract—Ideas and formalisms from far-from-equilibrium
thermodynamics are ported to the context of stochastic computa-
tional processes, via following and extending Tadaki’s algorithmic
thermodynamics. A Principle of Maximum Algorithmic Caliber is
proposed, providing guidance as to what computational processes
one should hypothesize if one is provided constraints to work
within. It is conjectured that, under suitable assumptions, com-
putational processes obeying algorithmic Markov conditions will
maximize algorithmic caliber. It is proposed that in accordance
with this, real-world cognitive systems may operate in substantial
part by modeling their environments and choosing their actions to
be (approximate and compactly represented) algorithmic Markov
networks. These ideas are suggested as potential early steps
toward a general theory of the operation of pragmatic generally
intelligent systems.
Keywords—maximum caliber, algorithmic information, path
entropy, AGI
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the successes of energy and entropy based formalisms
in physics, it is natural to want to extend them into other
domains like computation and cognition. This is one natural
path to follow in the quest to create general theories of real-
world general intelligence, extending beyond theories such as
Hutter’s AIXI [1] that model general intelligence elegantly but
only under the assumption of unrealistically ample computa-
tional resources.
In this vein, the aim here is to sketch a workable approach
to creating an energetic and entropic model of computational
processes, and to indicate some of the potential implications
of this model for cognitive systems.
I will explain how one can articulate highly general princi-
ples of the dynamics of computational processes, that take a
similar form to physics principles such as the stationary action
principle (which often takes the form of ”least action”) and
the Second Law of Thermodynamics (the principle of entropy
non-decrease). And I will explain how these principles may be
used to understand the perceptual, cognitive and active aspects
of intelligent systems.
In my recent work toward a general understanding of gen-
eral intelligence, I have done things like formalizing Cognitive
Synergy in terms of category theory [2], and articulating the
Embodied Communication Prior in regard to which human-
like agents attempt to be intelligent [3]. These ideas have
elaborated key aspects of general intelligence, but have not
given anything resembling a dynamical law of cognition. On
the other hand the “cognitive equation” I outlined in the 1990s
[4] is overly abstract, essentially formalizing the idea that
a cognitive system iteratively recognizes patterns in its own
structure and dynamics and then concretely instantiates these
patterns within itself. What has been lacking so far is an
abstract yet reasonably precisely defined articulation of the
dynamical laws of cognition.
Here I port several ideas from far-from-equilibrium thermo-
dynamics to the context of stochastic computational processes,
via following and extending Tadaki’s algorithmic thermody-
namics [5]. I propose a Principle of Maximum Algorithmic
Caliber , extending Jaynes Maximum Caliber Principle, which
provides guidance as to what computational processes one
should hypothesize if one is provided constraints to work
within. I then hypothesize that, under suitable assumptions,
computational processes obeying algorithmic Markov condi-
tions will maximize algorithmic caliber – and that, in ac-
cordance with this, cognitive systems may operate by mod-
eling their environments and choosing their actions to be
(approximate and compactly represented) algorithmic Markov
networks.
II. FRISTON’S FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE
Karl Friston’s “free energy principle” represents one well-
known effort in the direction of modeling cognition using
physics-inspired principles. It seems to me that Friston’s ideas
have some fundamental shortcomings – but that eviewing these
shortcomings has some value for understanding how to take a
more workable approach.
I should clarify that the ideas presented here were not
inspired by Friston’s thinking to any degree, but more so by
much older work in the systems-theory literature – e.g. Ilya
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Prigogine’s Order out of Chaos [6], Eric Jantsch’s The Self-
Organizing Universe [7] and Hermann Haken’s Synergetics
[8]. These authors represented a tradition within the complex-
systems research community, of using far-from-equilibrium
thermodynamics as a guide for thinking about life, the universe
and everything. Friston’s “free energy principle” seems to have
a somewhat similar conceptual orientation, but appears not
to to incorporate the lessons of far-from-equilibrium thermo-
dynamics very thoroughly, being based more on equilibrium
thermodynamics concepts [9] [10].
A number of authors and researchers in the AI and neu-
roscience fields have expressed confusion regarding Friston’s
ideas, e.g., [11] [12]. I share some of this confusion. As the
[12] notes, regarding perception, Friston basically posits that
neural and cognitive systems are engaged with trying to model
the world they live in, and do so by looking for models
with maximum probability conditioned on the data they’ve
observed. This is a useful but not adventurous perceptive,
and one can formulate it in terms of trying to find models
with minimum KL-divergence to reality, which is one among
many ways to describe Bayesian inference ... and which can
be mathematically viewed as attempting to minimize a certain
”free energy” function.
Friston then attempts to extend this principle to action via
a notion of ”active inference”, and here things get even less
clear As [9] puts it,
Active inference is a cornerstone of the free energy prin-
ciple. This principle states that for organisms to maintain
their integrity they must minimize variational free energy.
Variational free energy bounds surprise because the former
can be shown to be either greater than or equal to the
latter. It follows that any organism that minimizes free
energy thereby reduces surprise – which is the same as
saying that such an organism maximizes evidence for its
own model, i.e. its own existence.
...
This interpretation means that changing internal states is
equivalent to inferring the most probable, hidden causes
of sensory signals in terms of expectations about states of
the environment
...
[A] biological system must possess a generative model
with temporal depth, which, in turn, implies that it can
sample among different options and select the option that
has the greatest (expected) evidence or least (expected)
free energy. The options sampled from are intuitively
probabilistic and future oriented. Hence, living systems are
able to ?free? themselves from their proximal conditions
by making inferences about probabilistic future states and
acting so as to minimize the expected surprise (i.e. uncer-
tainty) associated with those possible future states. This
capacity connects biological qua homeostatic systems with
autonomy, as the latter denotes an organism?s capacity to
regulate its internal milieu in the face of an ever-changing
environment. This means that if a system is autonomous it
must also be adaptive, where adaptivity refers to an ability
to operate differentially in certain circumstances.
...
The key difference between mere and adaptive active
inference rests upon selecting among different actions
based upon deep (temporal) generative models that mini-
mize the free energy expected under different courses of
action. This suggests that living systems can transcend
their immediate present state and work towards occupying
states with a free energy minimum.
In this treatment, active inference is portrayed as a process
by which cognitive systems take actions aimed at putting
themselves in situations that will be minimally surprising, i.e.
in which they will have the most accurate models of reality.
If taken literally this cannot be true, as it would predict that
intelligent systems systematically seek simpler situations they
can model better – which is obviously not a full description of
human motivation, for instance. We do have a motivation to put
ourselves in comprehensible, accurately model-able situations
– but we also have other motivations, such as the desire to
perceive novelty and to challenge ourselves, which sometimes
contradict our will to have a comprehensible environment.
One clear criticism of this analysis of active inference is
that it’s too much about states and not enough about paths.
To model far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics using energy-
based formalisms, one needs to think about paths and path
entropies and such, not just about things like “work[ing] to-
wards occupying states with a free energy minimum.” Instead
of thinking about ideas like “selecting among different actions
based upon deep (temporal) generative models that minimize
the free energy expected under different courses of action.”
in terms of states with free energy minimum, one needs to
be thinking about action selection in terms of stationarity of
action functions evaluated along multiple paths.
III. ENERGETICS FOR FAR-FROM-EQUILIBRIUM
THERMODYNAMICS
It seems clear that equilibrium thermodynamics isn’t really
what we want to use as a guide for cognitive information
processing. Fortunately, the recent thermodynamics literature
contains some quite interesting results regarding path entropy
in far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics.
Abaimov’s paper General formalism of non-equilibrium
statistical mechanics, path approach [13] and Raphael Chetrite
and Hugo Touchette’s paper Nonequilibrium Microcanonical
and Canonical Ensembles and Their Equivalence [14] each tell
part of the story.
David Rogers and Susan Rempe in [15] describe explicitly
the far from equilibrium “path free energy”, but only for the
case of processes with short memory, i.e. state at time i + 1
depends on state i but not earlier ones (which is often fine but
not totally general).
The following table from [15] summarizes some key points
concisely.
Conceptually, the crux is that we need to think not about
the entropy of a state, but about the ”caliber” of a path – a
normalization of the number of ways that path can be realized.
This then leads to the notion of the free energy of a certain
path.
It follows from this body of work that ideas like ”free energy
minimization” need to be re-thought dynamically rather than
Fig. 1. Correspondence between the single-time maximum entropy formula-
tion of classical statistical mechanics, and the time dependent path maximum
entropy formulation.
statically. One needs to think about systems as following paths
with differential probability based on the corresponding path
free energies. This is in line with the ”Maximum Caliber
principle” [16] which is a generalization of the Maximum
Entropy principle to dynamical systems (both first proposed
in clear form by E.T. Jaynes, though Maximum Entropy has
been more widely developed than Maximum Caliber so far).
Extending these notions further, Diego Gonzalez [17] out-
lines a Hamiltonian formalism that is equivalent to path
entropy maximization, building on math from his earlier paper
[18].
IV. ACTION SELECTION AND ACTIVE INFERENCE
Harking back to Friston for a moment, it follows that the
dynamics of an intelligent system should be viewed, not as an
attempt by an intelligent system to find a state with minimum
free energy or surprisingness or any similar quantity, but rather
as a process of a system evolving dynamically along paths
chosen probabilistically to have stationary path free energy.
But of course, this would be just as true for an unintelligent
system as for an intelligent system – it’s not a principle of
intelligence but just a restatement of how physics works (in far
from equilibrium cases; in equilibrium cases one can collapse
paths to states).
If we want to say something unique about intelligent sys-
tems in this context, we can look at the goals that an intelligent
system is trying to achieve. We may say that, along each
potential path of the system’s evolution, its various goals will
be achieved to a certain degree. The system then has can be
viewed to have a certain utility distribution across paths – some
paths are more desirable to it than others. A guiding principle
of action selection would then be: To take an action A so that,
conditioned on action A, the predicted probability distribution
across paths is as close as possible to the distribution implied
by the system’s goals.
This principle of action selection can be formalized as KL-
divergence minimization if one wishes, and in that sense it
can be formulated as a ”free energy minimization” principle.
But it’s a ”free energy” defined across ensembles of paths, not
across states.
Relatedly, it’s important to also understand that the de-
sirability of a path to an intelligent system need not be
expressible as the expected future utility at all moments of
Fig. 2. Correspondence between standard classical statistical mechanics and
Tadaki’s algorithmic statistical mechanics.
time along that path. The desirability of a path may be some
more holistic function of everything that happens along that
path. Considering only expected utility as a form of goal leads
to various well known pathologies.
V. ALGORITHMIC THERMODYNAMICS
Next, how do we apply these same ideas beyond the realm
of physics, to more general types of processes that change
over time?
I am inspired by a general Whiteheadean notion of processes
as fundamental things. However, to keep things concrete, for
now I’m going to provisionally assume that the“processes”
involved can be formulated as computer programs, in some
standard Turing-equivalent framework, or maybe a quantum-
computing framework. I think the same ideas actually apply
more broadly, but – one step at a time...
Let us start with Kohtaro Tadaki’s truly beautiful, simple,
elegant paper titled A statistical mechanical interpretation of
algorithmic information theory [5].
Section 6 of Tadaki outlines a majorly aesthetic, obvious-
in-hindsight parallel between algorithmic information theory
and equilibrium thermodynamics. There is seen to be a nat-
ural mapping between temperature in thermodynamics and
compression ratio in algorithmic information theory. A natural
notion of “algorithmic free energy” is formulated, as a sort of
weighted program-length over all possible computer programs
(where the weights depend on the temperature).
The following table (drawn from Tadaki’s presentation here
[19]) summarizes the key mappings in Tadaki’s theory
To ground the mappings he outlines, Tadaki gives a simple
statistical mechanical interpretation to algorithmic information
theory. He models an optimal computer as decoding equipment
at the receiving end of a noiseless binary communication
channel. In this context, he regards programs for this computer
as codewords (finite binary strings) and regards computation
results (also finite binary strings) as decoded ?symbols.? For
simplicity he assumes that the infinite binary string sent
through the channel – constituting a series of codewords in
a prefix-free code is generated by infinitely repeated tosses
of a fair coin. Based on this simple reductive model, Tadaki
formulates computation-theoretic analogues to core constructs
of traditional equilibrium thermodynamics.
As a next step, it is clear one port the path-entropy based
treatment of far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics as outlined
above, to Tadaki’s algorithmic-information context, by looking
at sources emitting bits that are not independent of each other
but rather have some probabilistic dependencies..
One thus obtains an “algorithmic energy” function that
measures the energy of an algorithmic process over a period
of time – without assuming that it’s a memoryless process
like Tadaki does. One also obtains a principle of Maximum
Algorithmic Caliber, identical to the principle of Maximum
Caliber but with algorithmic information in the place of
Shannon entropy. (To get this to work, one needs to make
a few technical assumptions, e.g. one must assume that the
knowledge one has of the dependencies among the bits pro-
duced by the process is given the form of expectations.)
This appears to lead to something Friston promises but
doesn’t actually deliver: A rigorous sense in which complex
cognitive systems (modeled as algorithmic systems) are mini-
mizing free energy. The catch is that it?s an algorithmic path
energy.
More precisely, relative to an observer S who is observing
a system S1 in a certain way (by tabulating conditional
probabilities of “how often some event of type A occurs at
time T + s, given some event of type B occurred at time T “)
, we may say the evolution of S1 in S’s perspective obeys
an energy minimization principle, where energy is defined
algorithmic-informationally.
A. Potential Quantum Extensions
Tadaki’s treatment of algorithmic thermodynamics deals
only with algorithms running on classical computers, but it
appears his approach should be generalizable to the quantum
case as well.
In the quantum computing case, one is looking at series of
qubits rather than bits, and instead of tabulating conditional
probabilities one is tabulating amplitudes. The maximum
entropy principle is replaced with the stationary quantropy
principle [20] and one still has the situation that: Relative to
S who is observing S1 using some standard linear quantum
observables, S1 may be said to evolve according to a stationary
quantropy trajectory, where quantropy is here defined via
generalizing the non-equilibrium generalization of Tadaki’s
algorithmic-informational entropy via replacing the real values
with complex values.
VI. ALGORITHMIC CAUSAL NETWORKS AND ACTION
SELECTION
Ge et al [21] has shown that the maximal caliber is, under
broad assumptions, achieved by Markov processes. Specifi-
cally: When there are different possible dynamical trajectories
in a time-homogeneous process, then the only type of process
that maximizes the path entropy (given singlet statistics) is
a sequence of i.i.d. random variables, which is the simplest
Markov process. If the data is in the form of sequentially
pairwise statistics, then maximizing the caliber dictates that
the process is Markovian with a uniform initial distribution;
and if initial non-uniform dynamical distribution is known, or
multiple trajectories are conditioned on an initial state, then the
Markov process is still the only one that maximizes the caliber.
Similar results hold for processes that have history-dependence
that extends over a history of a fixed finite maximum length.
It would seem that no one has yet derived similar results
for the algorithmic caliber. What sort of dynamic will yield
maximal algorithmic caliber? What is the proper algorithmic
analogue of a Markov process?
Ganzing and Scholkopf [22] define an “algorithmic Markov
condition” that comprises an analogue of a standard Bayesian
causal network, but using conditional algorithmic information
instead of conditional probability. This is conceptually satis-
fying in the light of prior analyses of causality as a combina-
tion of temporal precedence and conditional probability, plus
the presence of a simple explanation [23]. The algorithmic
Markov condition embodies the “simple explanation” part
of commonsense causality (where simplicity is represented
by the minimization of program length at the center of the
definition of conditional algorithmic information), and then
if one moves to the level of a statistical ensemble, one
recovers conditional probability via the relationships between
algorithmic information and Shannon entropy.
It is very natural to conjecture that maximum algorithmic
caliber will be achieved via algorithmic processes whose
state transition graphs obey a algorithmic Markov con-
dition. I.e. if one needs to guess what program underlies
certain observations, and one assumes the underlying program
is time-homogeneous, then the most likely guess is going to
be a program that agrees with these observations and whose
state transition graph obeys an algorithmic Markov condition.
If an initial state is known then the conditional algorithmic
informations used to define the algorithmic Markov condition
can be additionally conditioned on the external state. If the
program is not time-homogeneous but depends on finite his-
tory, then this history-dependence can also be incorporated in
the conditioning.
Supposing some variant of this conjecture is validated via
detailed proof, there are potentially interesting implications for
perception and action in cognitive systems, i.e. one is moved
to suggest that
• A cognitive system should endeavor to model its envi-
ronment as an algorithmic process whose state transition
graph obeys an algorithmic Markov condition, which is
consistent with its observations
• A cognitive system should endeavor to select its actions
according to a plan that obeys an algorithmic Markov
condition, where the nodes in the algorithmic Markov
network represent (context, action) pairs (so that a causal
link between (a,c) and (a1, c1) in the network has the se-
mantics “ action a being taken in context c, implies action
a1 should be taken in context c1”. Given a collection
of goals, the goal-driven activity of a cognitive system
should be oriented to find a plan of this nature that has
maximum simplicity, consistent with being maximally
likely to achieve its goals.
• Cognition may be modeled in large part as perception
of a system’s internal knowledge base and action within
this internal knowledge base; in this context the above
two points apply to cognition as well
• A key aspect of the reflective self-modeling and so-
cial other-modeling of a cognitive system should be
to construct an algorithmic Markov network model of
itself and of other agents. Constructing an algorithmic
Markov model of its own prior actions and then executing
new actions according to this model, is a meaningful
form of not-necessarily-goal driven activity in a complex,
intelligent system.
A few caveats, however, are also critical here:
• Algorithmic information being uncomputable in general,
real cognitive systems will need to more or less roughly
approximate principles like these in practice. Principles
like Cognitive Synergy [2] may be considered partially as
strategies for approximating the learning of causal algo-
rithmic networks under limited resources in the context
of certain sorts of environments and goals.
• The above suggestions are statements about mathemati-
cal representability rather than about efficient pragmatic
knowledge representation. It may be that the algorithmic
Markov networks required for a certain cognitive system
are best represented in some other more compact form,
rather than explicitly as algorithmic Markov networks.
For instance a hypergraph like the OpenCog Atomspace
[24] [25] can be used as a compacted way of doing
storage and retrieval for a large number of complexly
overlapping algorithmic Markov networks dealing with
perceptual data, actions and action plans, or more abstract
cognitions.
• The mapping between maximum algorithmic caliber
and algorithmic Markov conditions has certain prereq-
uisite conditions, like time-homogeneity or limited-scope
history-dependence. Furthermore the heuristic of maxi-
mum algorithmic caliber is rough-and-ready and valuable
for cognitive systems, but isn’t the answer to every
problem an intelligent system faces. Sometimes the best
way to achieve system goals will involve learning patterns
and programs other than algorithmic causal networks.
What is proposed here is not a universal simplified solution
to the task of general intelligence under limited resources,
but rather an abstract formulation of a cognitive principle
which, via various pragmatic approximations, seems capable
to explain a large percentage of what a generally intelligent
cognitive system needs to do in practical settings.
Specifically if we think about the Embodied Communication
Prior [3] mentioned above, i.e. the task of being generally
intelligent in the context of controlling social communicative
agents that share physical environments with other social
communicative agents, then it is hypothesized that the vast
majority of perceptions and actions and a high percentage of
cognitions carried out by systems that are generally intelligent
in this setting can be explained as approximations to the
learning of causal algorithmic networks as outlined here.
VII. CONCLUSION
Connecting together a number of threads from recent re-
search in physics and computer science, we have articulated
some potential general principles governing the activity of
generally intelligent systems. Considerable mathematical work
will need to be done to transform the ideas and conjectures
outlined here into rigorous definitions, theorems and proofs.
However, we believe this is a valuable and worthwhile di-
rection for research; the key idea being to take key concepts
from far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics and port them to
algorithmic information theory, and using this methodology to
articulate laws and principles for (computationally-modeled)
cognitive activity, inspired by laws and principles of physics
together with concepts of cognitive modeling. Proposals such
as algorithmic Markov networks to model perception, action
and self-modeling have been presented here as initial examples
of cognitive theorization along these lines.
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